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Abstract	By	use	of	an	empirical	example	from	a	planned	organizational	change	program	within	an	international	company,	we	examine	how	specific	characteristics	of	objects	(forms)	used	to	represent	ideas	–		in	interaction	with	“hard-wired”	aspects	of	human	cognition	–		may	contribute	to	explain	outcomes	of	translation	processes	and	the	extent	of	alteration	of	the	design	of	the	future	organization.		We	argue	that	a	type	of	syllogism	judged	as	invalid	by	criteria	of	formal	logics	–	denoted	as	Erasmus	
syllogism	–	could	be	rather	common	in	reasoning,	and	that	these	logically	invalid	interferences	may	contribute	to	significant	innovations.	Situations	where	syllogisms	are	not	recognized	as	invalid	by	the	involved	actors	seem	to	be	more	prevalent	when	e.g.	the	actors	are	unfamiliar	with	the	semantic	content	(as	e.g.	abstract	symbols).	We	argue	that	understanding	of	semiotic	conditions	for	occurrence	of	formal	logically	invalid	syllogism,	as	well	as	of	the	neglect	of	their	invalidity	by	involved	actors	in	ongoing	discourses	and	reasoning,	may	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	how	ideas	and	objects	are	translated,	within	organizations	as	well	as	in	general.	The	discussion	is	a	contribution	to	better	understanding	of	why	and	how	ideas	are	altered	as	part	of	ongoing	sense	making	processes	within	organizations.			
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Introduction	For	some	decades,	the	study	of	how	normative	management	theories	are	developed	and	shared	within	and	between	organizations	has	been	a	research	topic	within	organizational	studies.	Two	important	concepts	applied	in	these	studies	have	been	translations	and	boundary	objects.	Use	of	the	concept	“translation”	is	often	associated	with	what	has	become	known	as	the	Scandinavian	branch	of	new	institutionalism	(see	e.g.		Czarniawska	and	Joerges	1996;	Czarniawska	2001;	Czarniawska	and	Sevón	2005;	Røvik	2002,	2011).	In	contrast	to	the	classical	works	on	management	theories,	which	argued	that	organizations	are	becoming	increasingly	more	alike	structurally	(Meyer	and	Rowan	1977;	DiMaggio	and	Powell	1983),	the	later,	new	institutionalists	have	been	focusing	on	how	shared	concepts	are	translated	and	sometimes	altered	when	they	are	used	within	different	organizations.	According	to	Czarniawska	and	Sevon	(2005)	their	main	objective	has	been	to	study:		‘….management	ideas	translated	into	objects	(models,	books,	transparencies),	sent	to	other	places	than	those	where	they	emerge,	translated	into	new	forms	of	objects,	and	then	sometimes	in	actions,	which,	if	repeated,	might	be	stabilized	into	institutions	through	abstract	ideas,	which	in	turn	could	be	described	and	summarized	through	abstract	ideas	and	so	in	and	so	forth.’	(Czarniawska	and	Sevon	2005:8).	The	concept	of	translation	has	been	among	the	main	concepts	used	by	Bruno	Latour	(1987)	in	his	actor-network	theory,	denoting	processes	where	objects	are	altered	by	humans	through	their	interpretations	and	actions.	Translation	is	related	to	diffusion,	where	the	latter	denotes	the	transfer	or	transmission	of	objects.	Diffusion	and	translation	are	conceptualized	as	related	to	each	other	as	Janus	faces,	i.e.	as	representing	two	contrasting	and	complementary	aspects.		Alterations	of	objects	and	meaning	have	been	explained	e.g.	as	results	of	divergent	interests	of	different	actors	and	of	how	intentions	(and	power	relations)	are	inscribed	in	the	objects	(cf.	Latour	1987).	Representatives	of	the	Scandinavian	new	institutional	perspective	have	proposed	similar	explanations.	For	example,	Brunsson	(1987)	proposes	that	conflicts	of	interest	and	divergent	ideologies	may	explain	the	alteration	process	leading	to	innovations.	The	potential	for	innovation	is	regarded	as	dependent	on	the	pluralism	of	ideologies	within	an	organization.			
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Compared	to	actor-network	theory	the	Scandinavian	branch	of	new	institutionalism	has	tended	to	be	more	oriented	towards	contextualized	local	interpretations.	The	alteration	process	of	both	objects	and	meaning	is	seen	as	a	consequence	of	a	variety	of	interpretations	conducted	by	distributed	actors	making	sense	of	objects	by	contextualizing	the	objects	to	local	institutional	traits	(Røvik	2016).	Processes	of	alteration	through	interpretations	have	been	denoted	as	contextualization,	recontextualization,	re-embedding,	etc.	(Wæraas	and	Nielsen	2016).	The	quest	has	to	some	extent	been	to	analyze	how	the	translated	concepts	cohere	to	established	practices	and	"world	views"	within	an	organization.	The	Scandinavian	new	institutionalism	has	been	criticized	for	regarding	almost	as	an	axiom	that	any	translation	process	will	result	in	a	transformation,	and	not	focusing	much	on	the	extent	of	alteration	(Røvik	2016).	In	general,	whether	implicit	or	explicit,	radical	innovations	have	mainly	been	explained	as	a	consequence	of	the	degree	of	differences	in	institutional	features.	It	has	been	argued	(see	e.g.	Lundberg	and	Sataøen	2014)	that	studies	of	the	processing	of	organizational	concepts	within	organizations	mainly	have	been	oriented	towards	the	introductions	of	metaphors,	such	as	e.g.	‘virus’,	‘mutations’,	‘immunity’,	‘incubation’	etc.	(see	e.g.	Røvik	2011)	used	to	denote	categories	for	classifying	different	types	of	alterations	and	translation	processes,	not	to	explain	how	such	processing	occurs.	Even	though	the	incorporation	of	cognitive	theory	is	considered	as	the	hallmark	that	distinguishes	new	institutionalism	from	traditional	institutionalism	by	the	use	of	concepts	such	as,	e.g.	schema	and	scripts	(see	e.g.	Scott	1995),	the	Scandinavian	traditions	do	not	seem	to	rely	that	profoundly	on	cognitive	theories	in	order	to	explain	the	actual,	observed	translation	processes.	The	concept	of	boundary	objects	has	been	used	in	order	to	analyze	organizational	learning	processes	and	how	organizational	features	change	due	to	ongoing	interactions	(Wenger	1998).	Wenger	operates	with	a	strict	distinction	between	forms	(“objects”)	and	meaning.	Forms	are	physical	artifacts	that	individuals	use	to	express	meaning,	i.e.	“objects”	that	may	be	shared	and	compared,	such	as	e.g.,	instruction	manuals,	posters,	tools	etc.	Meaning	is	related	to	these	objects	by	the	organizational	members	through	interaction.	This	conceptualization	makes	it	reasonable	to	assume	that	differences	in	form	may	imply	differences	in	meaning,	but	also	that	resemblances	in	form	do	not	necessarily	imply	resemblances	in	terms	of	meaning.	Wenger	(1998)	uses	the	concept	of	boundary	objects,	originally	developed	by	Star	(1988)	and	Star	and	Griesemer	(1989),	to	denote	artifacts,	documents,	terms,	concepts,	and	other	forms	of	reification	that	are	distributed	and	shared	among	communities,	which	in	turn	make	sense	out	of	them	and	act	towards	them	by	relating	them	to	local	symbols	and	belonging	meanings.	
Journal	of	Business	Anthropology,	9(1),	Spring	2020		
	114	
In	her	paper	‘This	is	Not	a	Boundary	Object:	Reflections	on	the	origin	of	the	concept’,	Star	argues	that	this	concept	introduced	by	her	has	been	often	used	by	researchers	to	address	‘interpretive	flexibility’,	i.e.	how	different	actors	through	ongoing	discourses	interpret	and	attribute	different	meanings	to	objects	(Star	2010,	614).	Star	criticizes	this	use,	by	claiming	that	this	use	of	the	concept	implies	nothing	more	than	following	the	‘constructivist’	approach	within	social	science,	i.e.	the	perspective	that	different	social	systems	construct	different	meanings.	Star	claims	that	one	important	aspect	of	boundary	objects	is	their	differences	in	terms	of	‘material/organizational	structure’	and	how	these	differences	matter	with	regard	to	how	people	are	able	to	act	towards	and	with	the	object.	In	this	article	we	will	argue	that	translation	processes	and	their	possible	outcomes	should	not	be	understood	and	analyzed	only	as	discursive	activity	conducted	by	specific	social	groups	with	belonging	socially	constructed	and	institutionalized	conventions.	We	will	argue	that	the	forms	of	the	objects	that	represent	meaning,	in	interplay	with	more	hard-wired	aspects	of	human	cognitive	capacities,	are	crucial	for	the	actual	outcome	of	the	translation	process.	These	aspects	are	viewed	as	important	in	order	to	understand	alterations	of	both	objects	and	meaning.	We	demonstrate	how	people	are	inclined	to	commit	one	type	of	logical	fallacies,	denoted	as	Erasmus	
syllogisms,	when	not	being	supported	by	adequate	semantic	content,	and	that	such	error	in	purely	logical	reasoning	may	contribute	constructively	to	significant	alterations	and	innovations.		The	remainder	of	this	paper	consists	of	our	1)	case	description	of	a	planned	change	process	in	an	international	company	and	the	merger	of	two	different	change	initiatives;	2)	formal	analysis	of	the	cognitive	coupling	between	the	two	change	initiatives;	3)	discussion	regarding	logic	vs.	semantics	in	cognition;	and	4)	conclusion.		
Case:	Processual	Change	Project	in	an	International	Oil	and	Gas	
Company	Our	empirical	example	is	picked	from	an	international	oil	and	gas	company	where	two	different	planned	organizational	change	programs	were	merged.	The	case	description	is	based	on	a	finding	during	a	longitudinal	fieldwork	within	the	company	between	the	autumn	of	1997	and	the	spring	of	2002	(Bye	2010).	The	objective	of	this	research	was	to	study	organizational	learning	processes	during	a	comprehensive	planned	change	project,	involving	all	subsidiaries.		Methods	used	to	obtain	data	during	the	fieldwork	included	surveys,	semi-structured	interviews,	open	ethnographic	interviews,	participatory	observation,	and	studies	of	documents	(reports,	design	descriptions	and	artefacts	as	work	process	charts,	e-posts,	letters,	
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informal	drawings,	logos	etc.).	The	fieldwork	was	multi-sited	within	the	organization	and	took	place	over	a	period	of	five	years.	In	the	beginning	of	the	research	project,	fieldwork	was	conducted	in	the	project	organization	responsible	for	designing	the	new	organizational	concept	during	a	period	of	18	months.	In	addition,	the	researcher	took	part	in	meetings	between	representatives	from	the	project	organization	and	the	local	subsidiaries.	Later,	a	six-month	period	of	fieldwork	was	conducted	in	implementation	projects	at	one	onshore	process	plant	and	at	an	offshore	installation	after	the	new	organizational	model	had	been	implemented.	The	research	method	was	predominantly	based	on	participant	observation,	where	the	researcher	worked	as	a	secretary	in	the	project	organization.	During	the	next	three	years,	several	shorter	fieldworks	(3-14	days)	were	conducted	within	four	different	subsidiaries	in	the	aftermath	of	the	local	implementation	processes.	This	research	was	predominantly	based	on	ethnographic	interviews	and	semi-structured	interviews,	combined	with	use	of	shadowing	(Czarniawska	2007)	and	participatory	transects	(Chambers	2006)	as	observation	techniques.	Two	surveys	were	conducted	during	the	research	period	in	order	to	measure	perceptions	of	and	attitudes	towards	the	new	organizational	concept,	and	the	results	of	the	following	analysis	(descriptive	statistics)	were	used	to	support	the	interpretation	of	the	qualitative	data.		One	of	the	change	initiatives	within	the	company	was	denoted	BOI	
(‘Best	Operator	in	the	Industry’),	and	the	other	was	denoted	BFA	(‘Better	
and	Faster	Administration’.	(In	the	context	of	the	present	article,	we	have	translated	from	the	local	language	into	English	the	names	of	the	change	initiatives	and	their	acronyms.)	BOI	had	been	initiated	several	years	before	BFA	and	was	a	change	initiative	that	emerged	as	part	of	a	rather	harsh	conflict	between	trade	unions	and	managers	in	one	of	the	company’s	divisions.	BOI	was	initiated	as	a	measure	proceeding	from	a	work	environment	survey	that	showed	very	low	confidence	in	the	management.	This	low	confidence	level	was	sought	and	explained	as	a	consequence	of	negative	experiences	from	several	improvement	programs	preceding	the	survey.	In	order	to	improve	the	relation	between	managers	and	employees,	there	was	established	a	work	group	consisting	of	representatives	from	both	the	trade	union	and	from	the	management.	Its	mandate	was	to	“describe	the	future	organization”.	The	work	of	the	group	was	facilitated	by	an	external	researcher	in	organizational	studies,	belonging	to	the	socio-technical	tradition	of	organizational	development	(see	e.g.	Trist	1976,	Emery	and	Thorsrud	1976)	and	inspired	by	the	theory	of	Total	Quality	Management	(TQM)	(Deming	1982,	Deming	and	Edwards	1982).		In	this	tradition,	as	well	as	in	this	theory,	key	concepts	used	in	representation	of	the	future	organization	are	‘self-managing	teams’	(see	e.g.	Hackman	1986)	and	
‘integrated	teams’	(Herbst	1976).	The	concept	of	self-managing	teams	has	
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been	used	in	normative	socio-technical	theory	and	emphasizes	organization	of	workers	into	teams	where	they	themselves	make	the	necessary	decisions	in	relation	to	a	particular	production	process	(see,	e.g.,	Manz	1992).	The	concept	of	integrated	teams	has	been	used	in	the	literature	to	denote	an	organizational	form	intended	to	promote	collaboration	and	effective	problem	solving	in	operational	activities	by	co-organizing	multidisciplinary	professionals	(e.g.	process	technicians,	mechanics,	electricians	etc.)	who	take	care	of	various	functions	in	the	particular	operation.	Here,	the	employees	handle	the	problem	solving	activity	themselves	without	relying	on	a	hierarchical	decision	system.	‘Integrated	teams’	has	been	conceptualized	as	an	organizational	form	that	represents	an	alternative	to	function-based	hierarchical	organization.	The	Japanese	improvement	system	denoted	as	Kaizen	teian	(‘improvement	suggestions’	has	been	considered	an	important	“tool”	within	the	TQM	literature	(see,	e.g.,	Gondhalekar,	Subash	Babu	and	Godrej	1995).		Kaizen	teian	denotes	a	team-based	system	for	generating	and	implementing	ideas	from	employees.		Kaizen	teian	is	sometimes	associated	with	Kaizen	teams,	i.e.,	‘improvement	teams’	(see	e.g.	Suárez-Barraza	and	Lingham	2008).	Common	for	these	three	concepts;	self-managing	teams,	integrated	teams,	and	Kaizen	teian;	is	that	they	emphasize	employee	involvement	as	an	instrumental	measure.		However,	descriptions	of	the	objectives	for	these	three	concepts	have	been	somewhat	different.	The	objective	of	self-managing	teams	has	been	conceptualized	as	a	contribution	to	democratization	and	counter	alienation	among	workers	in	a	particular	production	process,	and	at	the	same	time	to	improve	the	productivity.	The	objective	of	integrated	teams	has	been	conceptualized	as	improved	ability	to	solve	more	complex	and	unforeseen	problems	by	combining	the	skills	and	knowledge	of	the	different	team	members,	and	at	the	same	time	to	reduce	the	need	for	a	hierarchical	decision	system.	The	objective	of	improvement	teams	has	been	conceptualized	in	TQM	as	ensuring	that	personnel	with	direct	experience	of	manufacturing	processes	use	their	knowledge	to	improve	the	organization.	All	three	concepts	were	used	as	references	in	the	representation	of	BOI,	merging	them	together	and	preferring	‘integrated	teams’	as	an	umbrella	term.	If	we	look	into	the	three	terms	themselves,	they	all	include	the	term	“teams”.	Further,	the	referents	to	all	three	terms	seem	to	address	a	kind	of	employee	involvement.	The	term	“integrated	teams”	was	already	a	rather	familiar	term	within	the	organization,	having	been	applied	in	various	documentation,	and	with	this	concept	being	used	in	the	development	of	one	of	the	subsidaries.	It	seems	reasonable	that	the	combination	of	familiarity	with	this	term,	the	partial	similarity	of	form,	and	partial	coherence	between	the	references	to	the	three	terms,	may	account	for	the	merging	process.	The	other	change	initiative,	BFA,	was	a	planned	organizational	
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change	project	with	the	objective	to	standardize	the	way	of	doing	administrative	work,	conceptualized	as	work	processes,	throughout	the	organization.	The	standardization	was	supposed	to	reduce	costs	by	reconfiguring	the	steps	in	which	work	is	done,	as	well	as	the	responsibilities	to	perform	implied	tasks.	The	change	program	was	inspired	by	Business	Process	Reengineering	(BPR)	theories	for	organizational	change	(Hammer	1990;	Hammer	and	Champy	1993;	Davenport	1993;	Hammer	1996).	BPR	were	among	those	normative	improvement	theories	and	methods	that	were	most	popular	in	management	communities	during	the	1990s.		A	core	idea	of	this	method	was	to	combine	new	information	technology	with	human	tasks	in	order	to	change	the	production	process.	This	should	not	be	done	by	automating	existing	work	processes,	but	instead	by	combining	new	technology	and	tasks	performed	by	people	in	a	‘new	way’	(Hammer	1990).	Davenport	(1993,	5)	defines	process	as	‘a	structured,	measured	set	of	activities	designed	to	produce	a	specified	output	for	a	particular	customer	or	market,’	where	the	activities	may	be	conducted	by	a	machine	or	by	humans.	By	re-designing	work	processes,	it	is	argued	that	it	is	possible	to	make	radical	changes	in	the	organization	which	will	result	in	a	leap	in	productivity.	This	method	is	contrasted	to	e.g.,	TQM	which	has	been	criticized	for	just	providing	limited	improvement,	step	by	step,	based	on	existing	work	processes:		‘Nor	is	reengineering	the	same	as	quality	improvement,	total	quality	management	(TQM),	or	any	other	manifestation	of	the	contemporary	quality	movement	[quality	programs	works	within	the	framework	of	the	company´s	existing	processes	and	seek	to	enhance	them	by	means	of	what	Japanese	call	kaizen,	or	continuous	incremental	improvement.]	(…)	Reengineering,	as	we	have	seen,	seek	breakthroughs,	not	by	enhancing	existing	processes,	but	by	discarding	them	and	replacing	them	with	entirely	new	ones.’	(Hammer	and	Champy	1993,	49).	An	important	concept	within	the	reengineering	tradition	has	been	to	‘reuse’	human	and	activities	through	interaction	with	the	IT	system.	For	example,	ordering	a	spare	part	through	the	logistic	system	may	also	be	included	as	information	in,	e.g.,	the	accounting	systems	and	financial	processes.		The	information	system	that	was	used	in	the	BFA	project	was	SAP,	which	at	that	time	was	denoted	as	an	ERP	system	(Enterprise	Resource	
Planning).	SAP	is	an	IT	program	that	serves	the	totality	of	business	activities	in	a	company	(e.g.,	sales,	production	planning,	logistics,	human	resources,	accountancy,	finances	etc.)	and	where	it	is	possible	to	link	information	related	to	the	different	business	activities.	Several	of	the	reengineering	theorists	argue	that	one	should	focus	on	designing	the	work	process,	not	on	how	people	should	be	organized	
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and	managed	within	the	organization.	However,	some	organizational	features	are	assumed	to	be	consequences	of	the	reengineering	initiatives.	For	example,	Hammer	and	Champy	state	that	‘work	units	change	–	from	
functional	departments	to	process	teams,’	(Hammer	and	Champy	1993,	65)	that	‘people´s	roles	change	–	from	controlled	to	empowered’	(ibid,	70),	and	argue	that		‘empowerment	is	an	unavoidable	consequence	of	reengineered	processes;	processes	can´t	be	reengineered	without	empowering	process	workers’	(ibid,	71).		They	argue	that	new	effective	work	processes	require	more	judgment	rather	than	compliance	with	clearly	defined	rules	and	manual	tasks.	Thus,	workers	must	be	able	to	make	the	decisions	that	new	processes	require.	In	addition	to	allowing	new	and	more	efficient	processes,	it	is	also	expected	that	such	novel	work	processes	will	increase	workers'	job	motivation.		Another	recommended	change	in	the	formal	organization	from	reengineering	was	that	‘managers	change-from	supervisors	to	coaches’	(ibid,	76).	Managers	were	not	supposed	to	control	and	make	decisions	on	behalf	of	the	employees,	but	rather	to	coach	them	and	develop	their	skills	in	order	to	improve	their	ability	to	perform	their	tasks.	The	concept	of	‘empowerment’	has	been	discussed	within	the	community	of	organizational	studies,	and	has	been	contrasted	to	‘employee	involvement’	emphasized	in	socio-technological	normative	theories.	According	to,	e.g.,	Greenwood	and	Lewin	(1998)	‘empowerment’	shall	be	considered	as	a	means	to	increase	productivity,	not	to	be	based	on	a	democratic	ideal	and	an	objective	of	increased	job	satisfaction.	The	design	of	the	organization	should,	according	to	BPR	theorists,	be	conducted	by	dedicated	“re-engineering	teams”	with	responsibility	for	designing	processes	by	combining	performances	by	humans	and	by	information	technology.	The	ideal	for	the	design	work	was	to	be	freed	from	‘knowledge	of	the	past’	and	start	with	‘blank	sheets’.	Implementations	of	new	work	processes	should	be	based	on	a	centralized	management,	applying	measurable	indicators	and	incentive	systems	in	order	to	change	the	actions	performed	by	the	employees.	The	initiative	of	BFA	originated	from	top	managements,	while	concept	description	and	programming	were	conducted	by	a	project	team	with	members	recruited	from	different	divisions	and	departments	within	the	corporations	as	well	as	from	consultants	from	several	international	consulting	firms.	During	a	design	period	of	12	months	different	groups	developed	representations	of	the	imagined	new	organization	by	use	of	different	artefacts	such	as	documents,	transparencies,	charts,	e-learning	programs,	etc.		In	order	to	denote	and	represent	rather	complex	entities,	their	images	were	‘chunked’	into	new	abstract	concepts	as	a	part	of	the	ongoing	discourse.		Implementation	of	the	design	of	the	new	future	organization	turned	out	to	be	difficult.	Both	managers	and	employees	within	different	
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divisions	expressed	resistance	to	the	new	concept.	The	opposition	was	especially	apparent	from	one	of	the	company´s	divisions,	which	had	not	been	much	involved	in	the	development	process.	The	plans	for	the	new	organization	was	criticized	for,	e.g.,	lack	of	knowledge	about	development	and	production,	lack	of	humility	towards	existing	practices,	and	lack	of	involvement	of	the	offshore	organization.	Representatives	from	this	division,	from	now	on	referred	to	by	us	as	the	development	division,	pointed	out	that	BOI	was	the	change	program	that	they	were	going	to	realize,	not	BFA.	During	these	discussions	BOI	were	to	some	extent	revitalized,	from	merely	being	a	stored	document	describing	a	future	organization,	to	something	that	should	be	implemented.	The	lack	of	support	for	the	BFA	initiative	was	met	with	new	initiatives	from	representatives	of	the	BFA	project.	Among	these	was	the	establishment	of	a	new	project	team	with	the	mandate	to	adjust	the	BFA	model	by	integrating	experience-based	knowledge	from	the	development	division.	The	new	project	team	consisted	of	representatives	from	the	original	BFA	organization	as	well	as	of	representatives	from	the	development	division,	familiar	with	the	BOI	concept.	During	the	ongoing	re-design	and	re-representation	of	the	new	organization,	terms	and	concepts	as	‘self-managing	teams’,	‘integrated	teams’,	‘improvement	teams’,	and	‘process	teams’	were	used	as	references.	In	this	discourse	some	of	the	representatives	from	the	original	BFA	organization	stressed	and	promoted	that	BFA	should	be	a	‘quantum	leap’	in	accordance	with	BPR	theory	and	based	on	one	standardized	model,	not	a	gradual	improvement	process	with	the	danger	of	local	adaptations	and	variations.	In	contrast	to	this,	representatives	from	the	development	division	emphasized	that	‘people	had	to	be	involved’	and	should	‘recognize	their	established	practice	and	familiarity	with	continuous	improvement	processes’.	During	this	process	some	claimed	that	there	was	a	similarity	between	BOI	and	BFA,	represented	by	the	use	of	‘integrated	teams’	as	a	concept.	During	the	ongoing	discourse,	‘integrated	teams’	became	re-conceptualized	as	‘multidisciplinary	teams’,	‘empowered’	to	manage	and	make	decisions	according	to	the	designed	“work	processes”.		Different	‘integrated	teams’	were	going	to	be	responsible	for	specified	areas	or	parts	of	the	production	system.	These	teams	were	designed	as	independent	organizational	units,	defined	as	cost	centres	(units	where	cost	related	to	e.g.	work	hours,	equipment	and	spare	parts	are	allocated	through	the	IT-system).	The	managers	should	support	the	teams,	serving	more	as	‘coaches’	rather	than	acting	as	decision	makers.	During	the	design	process,	representatives	from	the	BFA	organization	was	concerned	that	the	concept	of	‘integrated	teams’	would	be	mixed	with	the	concept	of	‘self-managing	teams’,	underlining	that	‘they	were	not	the	same’.	They	argued	that	decisions	taken	by	the	teams	should	be	those	defined	by	the	work	processes,	not	by	the	organization	of	the	teams	themselves.	As	part	
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of	this	re-design	of	BFA	new	representations	were	developed	in	order	to	communicate	with	the	rest	of	the	organization.	Among	these	representations,	the	following	formula	was	used	in	the	communication	between	the	BFA	organization	and	the	development	division:			BFA	=	BOI	+	SAP	The	coupling	between	BOI	and	BFA	was	legitimized	by	claiming	that	both	descriptions	of	a	future	organization	used	‘integrated	team’	as	a	concept.	From	this	it	was	argued	that	BFA	was	partly	the	same	as	BOI.	The	main	difference	between	the	models	was	explained	to	be	that	BFA	included	the	use	of	the	SAP	information	system.		In	the	first	and	prototypic	implementation	project	within	the	subsidiary,	which	was	supposed	to	become	the	model	for	the	others,	much	attention	was	directed	towards	implementation	of	integrated	teams,	and	towards	distribution	of	responsibilities	among	the	team	members.	Themes	present	in	the	original	BOI	design	became	re-presented	in	the	local	discourse	among	both	managers	and	employees,	and	concerns	about	self-management	of	the	teams	were	focused	among	the	main	issues.		The	plant	was	divided	into	areas	with	attached	multidisciplinary	teams	(consisting	of,	e.g.,	process	technicians,	automation	technicians,	mechanics,	electricians,	crane	operators).	In	order	to	ensure	performance	of	tasks	related	to	human	resources,	procurement,	and	economy	within	each	team,	ascribed	roles	denoted	as	‘coordinators’	were	invented.	These	roles	were	organized	temporarily	and	based	on	rotation	between	team	members.		Further,	novel	roles	of	coordination	became	invented,	in	order	to	achieve	dedicated	responsibility	of	administrative	tasks	related	to	coordination	of	team	members’	activities,	financial	management	and	control	of	the	teams,	and	the	responsibility	to	follow	up	Health,	Safety	and	
Environment	(HSE)	related	activities	within	the	teams.	This	organizational	design	was	supposed	to	constitute	self-sufficient	teams,	capable	of	managing	themselves.	Managers	in	the	previous	hierarchical	and	function-	based	organization	became	re-organized	into	a	“management	team”	that	should	supervise	and	advise	the	other	teams,	based	on	ongoing	evaluations	of	the	teams’	decisions	and	performances.		The	most	apparent	consequence	during	the	implementation	of	the	new	organizational	form	in	the	subsidiaries	was	the	focus	on	establishing	successful	“integrated	teams”.	This	somewhat	conceptual	implementation	became	a	priority,	while	the	changes	in	work	processes	gained	less	attention.	The	focus	on	integrational	teams	tended	to	“overshadow”	other	aspects	of	BFA	design,	and	contributed	to	implementation	of	rather	innovative	solutions	for	how	the	teams	should	manage	their	daily	work.		
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Formal	Analysis	of	the	Cognitive	Coupling	Between	BOI	and	BFA	If	we	look	more	closely	at	the	formula	BFA=BOI+SAP	and	the	justification	for	this	representation,	the	implicit	reasoning	may	be	represented	by	the	following	formal	categorical	syllogism	which	we	denote	the	BFA-
syllogism:	BOI	has	‘integrated	teams’	BFA	has	‘integrated	teams’	and	SAP	Therefore,	BFA	is	BOI	with	SAP		Before	contemplating	this	syllogism	further,	let	us	first	as	reference	take	a	look	at	a	simple	syllogism	of	the	form:	P1:	a	is	c	P2:	b	is	a	C:	b	is	c	Here	the	expressions	P1	and	P2	represent	two	premises,	from	which	the	expression	C	is	implied	as	conclusion	with	logical	necessity.	This	reads	as:	IF	[a	is	c]	AND	[b	is	a];	THEN	[b	is	c].	As	an	illustration,	denote	’all	apes’	with	a;	‘all	gorillas’	with	b;	and	‘all	animals’	with	c.	Then	the	syllogism	reads	as:	IF	[all	apes	are	animals]	AND	[all	gorillas	are	apes];	THEN	[all	gorillas	are	animals].	This	reference	syllogism	is	always	true	due	to	the	classification	hierarchy	represented	by	the	terms	a,	b	and	
c.	 Let	us	next	consider	a	syllogism	of	the	following	form:	P1:	a	is	c	P2:	b	is	c	C:	b	is	a	We	name	this	form	the	Erasmus	syllogism,	inspired	by	the	notorious	argument	flung	out	by	the	character	Erasmus	in	Ludvig	Holberg’s	Norwegian	comedy	Erasmus	Montanus	(1967)	[1723]:	‘A	rock	cannot	fly;	Mother	Nille	cannot	fly;	ergo,	Mother	Nille	is	a	rock’,	where	after	Mother	Nille	bursts	into	crying.	We	may	denote	‘a	rock’	with	a;	“Mother	Nille”	with	b;	and	‘not	capable	of	flying’	with	c.	Then	the	syllogism	reads	as:	IF	[a	rock	is	not	capable	of	flying]	AND	[Mother	Nille	is	not	capable	of	flying];	THEN	[Mother	Nille	is	a	rock].	Trivially,	the	Erasmus	syllogism	is	invalid	by	the	criteria	of	formal	logic,	contrary	to	a	valid	syllogism	as	the	reference	syllogism	above.					
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Next	we	consider	the	following	syllogism:	P1:	a	is	c	P2:	b	is	c		P3:	b	is	d	C:	(b	is	a)	&	(b	is	d)	The	second	joint	and	sub-expression	in	the	conclusion,	(b	is	d),	is	identical	to	premise	P3	and	hence	this	sub-expression	is	trivially	implicated	from	P3.	P3	is	irrelevant	for	the	truth	of	the	first	sub-expression	in	the	conclusion,	(b	is	a).	Consequently,	the	possible	truth	of	(b	is	a),	as	well	as	the	possible	truth	of	the	conclusion	as	a	whole,	depends	solely	on	the	inference	from	premises	P1	and	P2	being	valid.	Thus,	in	order	to	judge	the	logical	validity	of	the	syllogism	as	a	whole,	we	can	remove	P3	from	the	three	premises,	as	well	as	the	sub-expression	(b	is	d)	from	the	conclusion.	The	remaining	syllogism	then	becomes	identical	to	the	Erasmus	syllogism,	and	therefore	invalid.	This	means	that	the	syllogism	as	a	whole	is	just	a	prolonged	version	of	the	Erasmus	syllogism	in	its	simplest	expression,	and	is	generally	invalid	by	exactly	the	same	criteria	of	formal	logics.	Due	to	the	logically	irrelevant	addition	of	(b	is	d)	to	premises	P1	and	P2,	as	well	as	to	the	conclusion,	we	name	this	prolonged	version	of	the	Erasmus	syllogism	a	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism.	As	an	illustration	of	a	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism,	we	denote	“a	human”	with	a;	‘a	seagull’	with	b;	‘an	organism	having	two	feet’	with	c;	and	‘an	organism	having	a	beak’	with	d.		Then	the	syllogism	reads	as:	IF	[a	human	is	an	organism	with	two	feet]	AND	[a	seagull	is	an	organism	having	two	feet]	AND	[a	seagull	is	an	organism	having	a	beak];	THEN	[a	seagull	is	a	human]	AND	[a	seagull	is	an	organism	having	a	beak].	We	may	re-express	the	logical	structure	of	this	syllogism	by	redressing	it	in	more	daily	day	language,	combining	P2	and	P3	into	one	prolonged	second	premise,	and	compressing	the	linguistic	expression	of	the	conclusion:		A	human	has	two	feet	A	seagull	has	two	feet	and	a	beak	Therefore,	a	seagull	is	a	human	with	a	beak	We	realize	that	the	logical	structure	of	this	syllogism	is	identical	to	the	logical	structure	of	the	BFA-syllogism	which	we	may	repeat	for	inconspicuous	comparison:	BOI	has	‘integrated	teams’	BFA	has	‘integrated	teams’	and	SAP	Therefore,	BFA	is	BOI	with	SAP		Thus,	we	also	realize	that	the	BFA-syllogism	represents	a	dead	
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weighted	Erasmus	syllogism,	and	is	invalid	by	criteria	of	formal	logics	for	exactly	the	same	reasons	that	Erasmus	syllogisms	in	general	are	invalid.	In	the	applied	illustration	involving	a	human	and	a	seagull,	the	logical	fallacy	of	the	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism	appears	obvious	due	to	the	concise	familiarity	with	the	involved	words	signifying	the	logical	terms	and	the	involved	semantic	relations	signifying	the	logical	relations.	In	spite	of	the	logical	identity	between	the	human/seagull	syllogism	and	the	BFA-syllogism,	in	the	last	case	the	logical	fallacy	appears	less	obvious	to	minds	who	lack	skills	in	logical	reasoning	sharp	as	a	razor	blade.	More		generally,	what	is	more	or	less	involved	here,	are	operators	in	cognition,	with	accompanying	brain	architecture,	working	towards	conflation	and	
confusion	of	cognitive	entities	residing	at	the	ontological	level	of	structural	logics	with	cognitive	entities	residing	at	the	ontological	level	of	
semantic	representation	(or	pre-representation)	of	structural	logics.		Also,	the	very	prolongation	of	the	involved	Erasmus	syllogism	into	a	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism,	may	work	to	amplify	the	impact	from	said	operators	in	cognition	working	towards	conflation	and	confusion.	This	is	easily	exposed	by	removing	the	logically	irrelevant	premise	P3,	duplicated	as	the	second	sub-expression	of	the	conclusion,	from	the	universal	and	elementary	form	of	the	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism.	When	redressed	into	daily	day	language	such	removal	results	in	the	following	expressions	of	the	human/seagull	syllogism	vs.	the	BFA-syllogism:	A	human	has	two	feet	A	seagull	has	two	feet		Therefore,	a	seagull	is	a	human			 BOI	has	‘integrated	teams’	BFA	has	‘integrated	teams’		Therefore,	BFA	is	BOI		With	respect	to	the	human/seagull	syllogism	this	reformulation	into	the	naked	Erasmus	syllogism	is	not	likely	to	make	any	difference	at	all	towards	judging	the	syllogism	as	invalid.	However,	with	respect	to	the	BFA-syllogism,	applying	less	familiar	and	concise	words	in	representation	of	the	logical	structure,	this	reformulation	is	likely	to	make	quite	some	difference	in	several	minds	for	the	cognition	of	the	logical	structure.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	anyone	involved	acknowledging	this	stripped	version	of	the	BFA-syllogism	as	logically	valid	(and	gaining	motivational	impetus	from	such	validity).	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	not	that	hard	to	imagine	several	persons	being	involved,	as	believing	in	the	logical	validity	of	the	prolonged,	dead	weighted	version	of	the	BFA-syllogism,	and	perhaps	even	become	motivated	for	changes	in	the	company	from	such	a	logically	false	
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belief.	Since	the	logical	structure	of	the	naked	Erasmus	syllogism	is	exactly	the	same	as	the	logical	structure	of	the	prolonged,	dead	weighted	Erasmus	syllogism,	also	in	the	case	of	the	semantics	provided	by	the	BFA-syllogism,	this	appears	as	a	rather	interesting	paradox.		This	seems	to	suggest	that	the	very	prolongation	of	the	Erasmus	syllogism,	into	its	dead	weighted	version,	works	more	or	less	towards	amplifying	significant	conflation	and	confusion	between	ontological	levels	of	structural	logics	vs.	levels	of	semantics,	via	operators	of	
complexification,	and	that	the	resulting	impact	in	some	cases,	as	the	present	one,	would	not	be	likely	to	occur	without	said	prolongation	and	complexification.	Further,	one	may	also	argue	that	the	BFA-syllogism	covers	a	certain	equivocation,	which	works	towards	a	fallacy	of	four	terms	
(quaternio	terminorum).	The	term	‘integrated	teams’	may	denote	two	rather	different	meanings,	and	for	this	reason	the	term	cannot	be	adequately	conceived	as	that	of	a	strict	and	concise	concept,	but	rather	as	a	homonym.	In	the	BFA	design,	the	referent	of	‘integrated	teams’	was	a	notion	of	a	group	of	employees	with	different	professions	and	competence	who	had	become	‘empowered’	to	accomplish	a	set	of	defined	decisions	in	specified	situations.	The	main	objective,	according	to	this	meaning	of	the	term,	was	to	improve	efficiency	and	production	flow.	In	BOI,	however,	‘integrated	teams’	denoted	a	notion	of	groups	of	employees	that	cooperate,	plan	and	make	decisions	regarding	their	daily	work,	rather	autonomously	and	more	extended	than	in	the	BFA	design.	In	this	interpretation	of	the	term,	involvement	in	decision	processes	was	not	limited	to	a	set	of	tasks	related	to	the	established	work	processes,	but	included	also	involvement	in	strategical	decisions	regarding,	e.g.,	how	the	work	should	be	organized	with	according	proper	allocation	of	resources.		A	main	objective	of	this	meaning	of	the	term	‘integrating	teams’	was	to	increase	the	well-being	of	the	workers	and	to	counteract	alienation.	The	formula	of	the	BFA-syllogism,	BFA=BOI+SAP,	worked	as	a	crucial	category	in	the	ongoing	discourse	forerunning	and	promoting	implementation	of	BFA,	despite	the	logical	fallacy	of	the	related	Erasmus	syllogism.	In	interactions	during	anthropological	field	work	in	the	company,	involved	actors	did	not	question	the	validity	of	the	formula,	nor	did	they	address	any	logical	issues	connected	to	the	formula.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	use	of	the	formula	in	communications	between	the	project	organization	and	the	rest	of	the	corporation,	
contributed	to	alteration	of	representation	and	implementation	of	BFA.	By	more	intimate	linking	of	BOI	and	BFA,	promoted	by	the	Erasmus	syllogism,	other	representations	and	aspects	associated	with	BOI,	not	included	in	the	BFA-syllogism,	became	included	in	novel	representations	of	BFA.	This	did	result	in	various	organizational	implementations	and	innovations,	based	on	the	merge	of	concepts	implied	in	BOI	and	BFA	
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design,	i.e.	on	emerging	conceptions	that	were	not	present	in	the	original	BFA	design.	Among	others,	such	innovations	included	the	implemented	notion	of	comprehensive	self-management	of	the	teams,	and	the	crucial	role	attributed	to	the	novel	notion	of	coordinators.			
Logical	Reasoning	and	Decision	Making	Limitation	in	terms	of	logical	reasoning	and	rational	decision-making	has	been	a	topic	in	organization	studies	for	decades.	Within	the	field	of	decision	theory,	the	concept	of	"bounded	rationality",	coined	by	Herbert	Simon	(1957),	captures	the	idea	that	rationality	of	individuals	is	limited	due	to	their	available	information,	cognitive	limitations	of	their	minds,	and	limitation	of	time	for	making	decisions.		James	March	(1994)	argues	that	decisions	may	primarily	be	about	completely	different	matters	rather	than	the	explicit	problems	and	solutions	being	addressed.	According	to	March	decision-making	processes	in	an	organization	can	also	be	about	positions,	legitimacy,	trust,	etc.	This	perspective	corresponds	to	Brunsson's	(1989)	formulation	of	“hypocrisy	talk",	in	an	attempt	to	describe	a	perceived	discrepancy	between	how	leaders	represent	their	organization	and	how	they	actually	act.	Such	discrepancies	are	explained	as	a	consequence	of	e.g.	reputational	aspects	("dynamic",	"active",	"up	to	date,"	etc.)	rather	than	the	stated	objectives	of	a	decision.	Within	the	"The	Garbage	Can	Model"	of	Cohen	et	al.	(1972)	problems,	solutions	and	decision	makers	are	treated	as	decoupled	from	each	other	in	terms	of	meaning.	Decision	situations	(denoted	as	"garbage	cans")	are	treated	as	a	kind	of	algorithm	that	links	problems	and	solutions.	This	results	in	an	available	repertoire	of	solutions	that	can	be	used	as	a	response	to	different	problems.	March	(1994)	points	out	that	only	a	limited	number	of	solutions	are	considered	sequentially	and	individually,	rather	than	simultaneously,	and	that	it	is	possible	to	associate	each	solution	with	a	plurality	of	problems,	provided	they	coincide	in	time.		The	research	of	Kahneman,	Tversky	and	Slovic	has	contributed	to	the	understanding	of	cognitive	biases	of	individuals	when	making	decisions	(Kahneman	et	al.	1982).	Kahneman	has	developed	the	concept	of	heuristics	in	order	to	denote	simple	strategies	and	cognitive	processes	that	are	applied	to	quickly	perform	judgements,	make	decisions	and	find	solutions	to	complex	problems	(Kahneman	et	al.	1982).	Based	on	a	wide	range	of	experiments,	a	number	of	different	logical	fallacies	have	been	identified.	One	example	is	the	so-called	conjunction	fallacy,	which	is	also	known	as	the	Linda	problem.	This	logical	fallacy	occurs	when	it	is	assumed	that	specific	conditions	are	more	probable	than	a	single	general	one.	In	the	experiments	the	participants	were	given	a	description	about	Linda,	a	31-year	old,	single,	outspoken,	and	very	bright	woman	with	a	
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major	in	philosophy.	Further,	the	respondents	were	informed	that	as	a	student,	she	was	deeply	concerned	with	issues	of	discrimination	and	social	justice,	and	also	participated	in	anti-nuclear	demonstrations.	Then	the	test	persons	were	asked	to	assess	the	likelihood	of	different	statements	about	Linda.	The	majority	of	the	test	persons	tended	to	consider	the	statements	more	likely	to	be	true,	if	the	statements	were	more	comprehensive.	For	instance,	they	tended	to	rate	the	statement	"Linda	is	a	bank	teller	and	is	active	in	the	feminist	movement"	as	more	likely	than	the	statement	that	just	claimed	that	"Linda	is	a	bank	teller",	although	the	probability	of	the	two	characteristics	(bank	teller	and	feminist)	to	be	true,	is	less	than	the	single	characteristic	(just	being	a	bank	teller).	The	fallacy	is	explained	as	a	consequence	of	people	considering	"feminist"	as	more	representative	for	the	person	Linda	than	"bank	teller".	Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1982,	1983)	consider	the	conjunction	fallacy	as	a	consequence	of	a	cognitive	process	denoted	as	the	representativeness	heuristic.		This	heuristic	implies	that	people	may	perform	logically	biased	judgements	based	on	how	high	representativeness	an	attribute	has	as	compared	with	the	prototypic	attribute	of	a	category.	More	generally	regarded,	one	significant	finding	from	tests	of	skills	in	logical	reasoning	carried	out	by	cognitive	science,	is	that,	for	most	humans,	the	semantic	content	of	a	syllogism	highly	influences	the	chance	for	being	able	to	perform	a	logically	correct	deduction,	despite	that	the	semantic	content	is	irrelevant	for	the	logical	form	of	the	syllogism.	Interestingly,	such	influence	also	occurs	in	test	situations	where	subjects	are	instructed	to	not	look	at	the	semantic	content	but	to	solely	consider	the	logical	structure.		Some	early	tests	triggered	the	so-called	Wason	problem	challenged	to	explain	the	empirical	fact	that	the	success	rate	to	perform	a	certain	deduction	exposed	an	immense	variation	(between	20%	and	70%!)	among	American	undergraduates,	dependent	on	the	semantic	dressing	of	the	identical	structural	logic	(cf.	Wason	1968).		D’Andrade	(1989,	1992,	1995)	presented	a	pioneering	work	establishing	cognitive	anthropology	as	a	novel	(sub-)discipline,	congruent	with	and	inspired	by	many	results	from	cognitive	science	as	well	as	by	certain	anthropological	studies	and	theories.	Besides	his	overwhelmingly	theoretical	contribution,	building	on	empirical	results	and	ethnographic	works	by	others,	relevant	for	cognitive	anthropology,	D’Andrade	also	designed	and	carried	out	interesting	tests	among	American	college	students	in	order	to	map	and	contemplate	influences	from	semantic	content	which	disturbed	cognitive	abilities	to	perform	logically	correct	deductions	(cf.	D’Andrade	1995,	203,	table	8.2,	with	related	discussion).	His	tests	involved	three	different	kinds	of	deductions,	when	varying	the	degree	of	‘realistic	content’	vs.	‘arbitrary	content’	in	the	semantic	dressing	of	these	three	deductions.	In	the	present	context	we	will	only	contemplate	
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two	of	these	three	kinds	of	deductions,	namely	modus	ponens	(IF	P1:	if	p	then	q,	AND	P2:	p;	THEN	C:	q),	and	modus	tollens	(IF	P1:	if	p	then	q,	AND	P2:	not	q;	THEN	C:	not	p).	Some	main	results	of	his	tests	were:	With	respect	to	modus	ponens	the	success	rate	of	being	able	to	perform	a	correct	deduction	varied	between	96%	and	80%,	decreasing	with	‘arbitrary	content’	relatively	to	‘realistic	content’	With	respect	to	modus	tollens	the	rate	of	success	varied	between	96%	and	33%,	decreasing	much	more	radically,	as	compared	to	
modus	ponens,	with	increase	in	“arbitrary	content”	relatively	to	the	logical	reasoning	being	supported	semantically	by	“realistic	content”.	Interestingly,	the	lowest	correct	score	with	respect	to	modus	
tollens,	i.e.,	33%	(!),	manifested	from	semantic	dressing	of	the	syllogism	as:	“IF	[J	is	true,	then	K	is	true]	AND	[not-K	is	true],	THEN	…’.	(The	dots	‘…’represent	three	alternatives	for	an	answer;	cf.	D’Andrade	1989.)	The	
third	lowest	score	(among	13	variations	of	semantic	dressing),	i.e.,	45%,	manifested	from	the	semantic	dressing	of	the	modus	tollens	syllogism	as:	“IF	[D	is	true,	then	E	is	true]	AND	[E	is	false],	THEN	…”.	A	rather	obvious	interpretation	of	the	test	results	referred	in	the	last	paragraph,	is	that	the	very	act	of	abstraction	from	any	semantic	dressing,	tended	strongly	to	make	it	even	more	difficult	for	most	test	subjects	to	perform	a	correct	deduction	of	modus	tollens,	as	compared	to	when	the	syllogism	was	dressed	in	more	familiar	words	from	daily	day	language,	even	when	such	familiar	semantics	were	highly	‘arbitrary’	or	even	rather	nonsensical,	relatively	to	“realistic”.	These	test	results	may	appear	highly	surprising	for	gifted	minds	or	those	skilled	in	formal	disciplines	as	mathematics,	logics	and	informatics,	minds	that	in	most	cases	will	perform	deductions	with	more	ease	when	the	semantic	dressing	has	become	stripped	and	abstracted.	Nevertheless,	it	is	interesting	to	acknowledge	that	cognition	works	differently	in	most	minds,	and	it	is	not	likely	that	the	sample	involved	in	the	tests	by	D’Andrade	possessed	an	average	IQ	below	100.	Despite	that	generalization	from	one	sample	to	others	should	be	associated	with	some	caution,	these	test	results	seem	to	be	of	some	special	interest	with	respect	to	contemplating	the	impact	or	seduction	from	the	BFA-syllogism.	Said	test	results	suggest,	other	things	equal,	that	semantic	dressing	involving	symbols	of	high	abstraction	makes	it	more	difficult	for	most	humans	to	perform	logical	reasoning	and	to	become	
most	seriously	disturbed	in	their	logical	reasoning	from	this	semantic	dressing	of	the	involved	syllogisms.	This,	rather	paradoxically,	being	so	in	spite	of	the	obvious	fact	that	such	abstractions	are	crucial	and	necessary	in	more	or	less	formal	disciplines	of	science.	(The	difference	between	the	33%	case	and	the	45%	case	may	be	explained	by	that	cognitive	recognition	of	the	negation	involved	in	the	second	premise	expressed	as	[not-K	is	true]	will	involve	a	bit	more	cognitive	effort	than	the	expression	
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[E	is	false],	despite	their	logical	identity.	This	difference	may	be	of	some	more	general	interest	as	suggesting	that	apparently	minor	differences	between	decisive	thresholds	in	cognitive	efforts	may	be	rather	crucial	in	order	to	make	a	difference	for	performing	correct	logical	reasoning.	Thus,	said	difference	confirms	and	extends	the	more	striking	difference	between	the	two	thresholds	in	cognitive	efforts	being	able	to	perform	modus	
tollens	vs.	modus	ponens.)		One	of	us	(Johansen)	carried	out	a	simple	test	on	novel	master	students	in	social	anthropology	at	Norwegian	University	of	Science	and	
Technology,	in	order	to	indicate	skills	in	logical	reasoning	and	to	illustrate	significance	of	cognitive	anthropology.	The	same	test	was	repeated	for	three	cohorts	of	students	(Fall	2013,	Fall	2014,	Fall	2015),	involving	a	total	sample	of	38	students.	During	the	15	minute	break	between	two	lectures	in	cognitive	anthropology	the	students	would	anonymously	answer	a	questionnaire	consisting	of	three	questions,	choosing	among	three	alternative	answers	where	one	and	only	one	represented	a	correct	logical	deduction.	Achieving	a	correct	answer	to	questions	no.	I	and	II	required	a	modus	tollens	deduction,	and	achieving	a	correct	answer	to	question	no.	III	required	a	modus	ponens	deduction.	The	semantic	content	of	syllogism	II	was	chosen	to	be	familiar	and	realistic,	while	the	semantic	content	of	syllogism	I	was	chosen	to	be	familiar	while	only	moderately	realistic.	The	prediction	was	that	more	students	would	perform	a	correct	deduction	of	syllogism	II	than	of	syllogism	I,	despite	the	logical	structure	of	modus	tollens	being	exactly	the	same	and	the	students	being	instructed	before	the	test	that	they	should	only	consider	the	logical	connection	between	premises	and	conclusion,	not	the	realism	of	the	semantic	content.	Among	the	total	sample	of	38	students,	29	students	answered	question	II	correctly,	while	only	16	students	answered	question	I	correctly,	thus	strongly	confirming	the	prediction.	Syllogism	III	had	identical	semantic	content	as	syllogism	I,	thus	chosen	to	be	familiar	while	only	moderately	realistic,	so	that	the	difference	between	syllogisms	I	and	III	was	solely	due	to	the	formal	difference	between	modus	ponens	and	
modus	tollens.	The	prediction	was	that	more	students	would	perform	a	correct	deduction	of	syllogism	III	than	I,	due	to	modus	tollens	being	more	cognitively	demanding	to	perform	than	modus	ponens.	29	students	answered	question	III	correctly,	a	rather	striking	difference	to	the	16	students	answering	question	I	correctly.	12	students	answered	all	three	questions	correctly,	while	2	students	gave	wrong	answers	to	all	three	questions.	With	respect	to	over-all	performance	in	logical	reasoning,	there	did	not	occur	any	striking	difference	between	the	three	cohorts	of	students.	These	test	results	were	in	good	agreement	with	the	results	of	the	referred,	similar	and	more	extended	tests	carried	out	by	D’Andrade,	thus	providing	further	support	to	the	significance	of	semantic	content	for	most	humans	being	able	to	perform	correct	logical	reasoning.		
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From	experimental	evidence	it	appears	as	an	empirical	fact	that	most	humans,	even	among	those	above	average	intelligence,	are	not	able	to	perform	correct	logical	deductions	without	their	logical	reasoning	being	supported	by	adequate	semantic	content,	as	soon	as	the	involved	deductions	are	a	bit	more	complex	than	modus	ponens.	D’Andrade	(1995,	203-217)	presents	an	informed	discussion	in	order	to	account	theoretically	for	such	empirical	facts	demonstrated	by	experiments	of	cognitive	science.	He	addresses	the	constraint	represented	by	two	forms	of	abstraction	(ibid.,	207)	from	content	to	form	being	difficult	for	most	humans	to	perform.	More	generally	he	argues	that	logical	reasoning	is	highly	dependent	on	the	reasoning	subject	being	equipped	with	a	cultural	schema	(ibid.,	205)	of	semantic	content	in	order	to	adequately	access	and	implement	the	structural	logic	into	successful	performance	of	logical	reasoning.	The	concept	of	“schema”	can	be	traced	at	least	back	to	Kant	referring	to	the	schema	of,	e.g.,	a	dog	as	a	pattern	in	the	mind	being	able	to	recognize	a	dog	as	a	dog	despite	that	this	pattern	of	a	dog	does	not	have	any	unique	concrete	manifestation.	Kant’s	notion	of	schema	is	consistent	with	much	theory	and	experiments	from	modern	cognitive	science.	In	prototype	theory,	initiated	by	E.	Rosch,	cf.	especially	Rosch	(1983)	with	respect	to	the	present	discussion,	the	prototype	of,	e.g.	a	bird,	is	regarded	as	a	cognitive	ideal	type	where	no	concrete	bird	will	match	this	pattern	completely.	Various	kinds	of	birds	will	match	this	ideal	type	in	different	degrees	(with	modest	individual	and	cultural	variation),	so	that	some	birds	will	be	conceived	as	more	birds	than	others.	Classification	of	whether	an	animal	is	conceived	as	a	bird	at	all,	stretches	out	from	the	prototype,	so	that	binary	cognition	is	constituted	by	analog	representation	extending	from	the	prototype.	Typically,	the	border	zone	for	classification	will	appear	somewhat	fuzzy.	For	zoologists	a	penguin	is	classified	as	a	bird,	while	for	many	respondents	this	will	not	be	the	case,	due	to	the	penguin	lacking	the	attribute	of	being	able	to	fly,	an	attribute	that	is	crucial	in	their	implied	prototype	of	‘bird’	in	their	cognitive	category.	Let	us	contemplate	the	following	two	syllogisms:	P1:	If	the	penguin	is	a	bird,	then	the	penguin	can	fly	 	P2:	The	penguin	cannot	fly	C:		The	penguin	is	not	a	bird		P1:	If	the	penguin	cannot	fly,	the	penguin	is	not	a	bird		P2:	The	penguin	is	a	bird	C:		The	penguin	can	fly	If	p	denotes	[The	penguin	is	a	bird];	and	q	denotes	[The	penguin	can	fly],	the	first	syllogism	has	the	form:	IF	[p	=>	q]	AND	not-q,	THEN	not-
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p,	i.e.	the	form	of	modus	tollens.	The	second	syllogism	has	the	form:	IF	[not-q	=>	not-p]	AND	p,	THEN	q.	If	we	substitute	symbols	p	and	q	with	symbols	r	and	s,	defined	as	
r=not-q	and	s=not-p;	this	syllogism	has	the	form	IF	[r	=>	s]	AND	not-s,	THEN	not-r.	This	is	the	same	form	of	modus	tollens	as	the	first	syllogism,	and	it	is	disclosed	that	the	two	syllogisms	are	just	two	equivalent	semantic	expressions	of	the	same	logical	relations.	Despite	this	equivalence	it	is	rather	obvious	that	the	ability	to	successfully	perform	the	two	syllogisms	will	be	different	for	many	test	subjects.	While	the	first	syllogism	is	not	likely	to	be	much	demanding,	although	some	zoologists	may	be	a	bit	puzzled,	the	second	syllogism	is	not	likely	to	yield	a	high	success	rate.	The	main	reason	for	this	difference	is	that	the	semantic	content	of	the	conclusion	in	the	second	syllogism	for	most	test	subjects	will	appear	more	radically	different	from	their	everyday	notions	and	semantic	cognition,	so	that	their	logical	reasoning	more	easily	will	become	disturbed	by	the	feeling	that	there	must	be	something	wrong	with	the	deduction.	Mandler	(1984,	55)	argues	that	‘activation	of	parts	of	a	schema	implies	the	activation	of	the	whole,	distinct	from	other	structures	and	other	schemas’	(our	italics).	Such	cognitive	schemas	develop	from	life	experience,	and	are	embedded	in	semantics	and	grammar	of	natural	languages	as	well	as	in	various	cognitive	operators	residing	in	unconscious	layers	of	the	mind.	Thus,	logical	reasoning	is	more	difficult	when	semantic	contents	of	logical	expressions	do	not	match	preceding	schemas	becoming	activated	when	processing	such	contents.	Such	lack	of	matching	may	be	due	to	unfamiliarity	with	semantic	content	(as	abstract	symbols),	lack	of	realism	(as	‘the	penguin	can	fly’),	or	classification	hierarchies	in	preceding	schemas	being	in	conflict	with	or	too	fuzzy	to	match	the	propositions	involved	in	the	logical	expressions.	On	the	other	hand,	when	the	matching	is	good	between	the	semantic	content	in	the	logical	expressions	and	well-formed	preceding	cognitive	schemas,	logical	reasoning	becomes	facilitated.	Since	Erasmus	syllogisms	are	not	logically	valid,	they	represent	a	somewhat	opposite	case	to	syllogisms	as	modus	ponens	and	modus	tollens.	Depending	on	semantic	content	expressing	logical	relations	of	form,	with	related	activation	of	preceding	cognitive	schemas,	Erasmus	syllogisms	may	not	seldom	be	conceived	falsely	as	valid,	for	reasons	analogous	to	those	stimulating	cognition	of	valid	syllogisms	as	false.	With	respect	to	sensory	and	neurological	events	involved	in	
perception,	overwhelming	dominance	of	Erasmus	syllogisms	is	a	hard-wired	necessity.	By	means	of	fine-grained	measurement	apparatus,	functioning	as	prolonged	amplification	of	our	senses,	we	can	observe	that	the	magnitude	of	two	incoming	stimuli,	when	sufficiently	close	as	
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registered	by	our	instruments,	are	not	distinguished	in	response	after	entering	the	skin	of	an	organism.	This	means	that	two	different	stimuli	a	vs.	b	are	represented	by	the	same	quantity	c	functioning	as	input	for	the	next	level	of	neurological	processing	inside	the	skin	of	the	organism.	This	means	that	already	reception,	understood	as	the	first	and	elementary	act	of	perception,	implies	activations	of	Erasmus	syllogisms.	The	neurological	process	constituting	the	first	percept	available	for	the	conscious	mind,	involves,	at	least	typically,	certain	input-output	algorithms	through	six	layers	of	the	brain	architecture	(see,	e.g.,	Churchland	1986	for	basic	details).	These	algorithms	are	based	on	traceless	classifications	(as	distinguished	from	reflexive	classifications);	i.e.,	that	such	algorithms	represented	do	not	preserve	a	memory	of	the	distinction	between	close	input	values	after	the	algorithm	has	processed	the	two	input	values	into	the	same	output	value.	(Cf.	foremost	Johansen	2008,	41ff,	and	next	Johansen	2018,	232-234,	for	definitions	of	these	two	concepts	with	related	discussions	to	philosophy,	informatics	and	neuroscience.)	In	general,	traceless	classification	implies	occurrence	of	Erasmus	syllogisms,	so	that	the	very	constitution	of	perceptions	involves	massive	(while	concise)	activations	of	Erasmus	syllogisms	through	the	cascade	of	algorithmic	steps	being	implied	in	according	neurological	processing	into	percepts	available	for	consciousness.	Further,	rich	experimental	evidence	with	related	theoretical	interpretations	suggest	that	the	Weber-Fechner	
law,	with	related	logarithmic	conflation	of	input	differences	into	output	non-differences	(as	well	as	into	more	gross	and	prevailed	differences),	plays	a	key	role	in	neurological	algorithms	constituting	perception,	and	this	being	much	so	across	species	as	well	as	across	various	senses	of	perception.		Viewed	from	an	evolutionary	or	more	neo-Darwinian	perspective	this	massive	occurrence	of	Erasmus	syllogisms	involved	in	perception	makes	much	sense,	due	to	such	cognitive	economy	being	much	advantageous	in	survival	into	the	fittest.	If	minor	differences	in	incoming	stimuli	for	perception	do	not	matter	much	for	survival,	they	will	tend	to	diminish	from	this	perspective,	because	the	over-all	capacity	of	the	mind/brain’s	information	processing	can	give	more	attention,	with	related	increased	attention	to	differences	that	make	more	of	a	difference	with	respect	to	issues	that	really	matter	for	survival.	(For	theoretical	discussion,	see	Bateson	1987,	123ff;	Johansen	2008,	26-34;	Johansen	2018,	232f.)	
Gregory	Bateson	(1987,	cf.	also	1972,	1988)	was	the	first	to	pay	very	serious	scientific	attention	to	Erasmus	syllogisms	as	highly	important	in	order	to	understand	cognition,	evolution,	and	culture.	Bateson	did	not	use	the	term	“Erasmus	syllogism”,	but	alternated	between	the	terms	‘syllogisms	of	grass’	(which	is	one	paradigmatic	case	of	an	Erasmus	syllogism)	and	‘metaphor’.	With	respect	to	‘metaphor’	we	can	explain	the	tacitly	involved	Erasmus	syllogism	as	follows:	Say	that	
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phenomenon	a	can	be	denoted	metaphor	for	another	phenomenon	b,	if	and	only	if	phenomenon	a	stands	in	the	same	relation	to	a	phenomenon	d	as	phenomenon	b	stands	to	a	phenomenon	e.	If	we	apply	c	to	denote	location	at	the	left	side	of	such	a	relation,	the	metaphor	then	rests	upon	the	following	inference:	‘a	is	c;	b	is	c;	ergo:	b	is	a’	Thus,	we	see	that	application	of	a	as	valid	metaphor	for	b	depends	upon	an	inference	having	the	form	of	an	Erasmus	syllogism.	Bateson	argued	strongly,	drawing	on	inter-disciplinary	knowledge	as	well	as	on	his	own	epistemology,	that,	despite	the	invalidity	of	‘syllogisms	of	grass’	and	‘metaphor’	as	judged	from	criteria	of	formal	logic,	these	cognitive	operators	play	a	crucial	role	in	nature,	spanning	from	perception	to	more	elaborate	phenomena	as	poetry,	humor,	religion,	and	dreams:	
[T]hese	syllogisms	are	the	very	stuff	of	which	natural	history	is	
made	(…)	all	preverbal	and	nonverbal	communication	depends	
upon	metaphor	and/or	syllogisms	in	grass	(…)	all	verbal	
communication	necessarily	contains	metaphor	(…)	metaphor	is	in	
fact	the	logic	upon	which	the	biological	world	has	been	built	(Bateson	1987:	27–30).	Bateson	also	pointed	out	that	even	the	very	formulations	of	syllogisms	of	formal	logic	presuppose	linguistic	classifications	of	semantic	entities	as	well	as	of	the	very	categories	of	grammar	themselves.	Today,	it	should	not	be	scientifically	controversial	to	state	that	creativity	may	emerge	with	catalysts	of	decisive	inputs	from	ontological	domains	of	poetry	or	of	dreams.	Even	in	the	history	of	hard	science	we	have	at	least	some	spectacular	cases	of	such	crucial	emergences,	as	probably	most	strikingly	illustrated	by	Tesla’s	(initial)	invention	of	the	induction	motor	triggered	by	poetry,	and	by	Ramanujan’s	discovery	of	mathematical	theorems	triggered	by	experiences	in	dream	space.	Thus,	it	seems	reasonable	to	acknowledge	that	innovations,	major	or	minor,	sometimes	are	crucially	catalyzed	by	means	of	novel	semantic	
instantiations	of	Erasmus	syllogisms,	where	the	details	of	such	catalysts	may	have	strong	cultural	and	context	dependent	constraints.	We	find	it	reasonable	to	comprehend	the	rather	successful	innovations	and	implementations	proceeding	the	BFA-syllogism,	as	one	such	instance.	In	short,	the	paradox	is:	If	you	are	not	able	to	become	seduced	into	some	false	logical	reasoning,	there	may	be	something	important	and	innovative	you	will	not	become	able	to	achieve.		
Cognition,	Semantics,	and	Translation	of	Boundary	Objects	Turning	back	to	our	critical	remarks	to	Scandinavian	new	institutionalism,	our	findings	may	contribute	to	a	more	elaborated	theory	of	translation	processes.	Our	main	contribution	is	that	we	provide	a	
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possible	explanation	for	why	certain	radical	innovations	may	occur,	and	that	radical	alteration	of	boundary	objects	should	not	necessarily	be	explained	primarily	by	searching	for	coherence	with	institutional	traits	related	to	the	context	of	the	translators.	Certainly,	our	empirical	example	could	be	analysed	as	a	process	of	enrolment	of	actors	during	which	meanings,	claims	and	interests	are	inscribed	in	representations	(cf.	Latour	1987),	and	as	a	translation	process	enhanced	by	divergent	interests	and	ideologies	(cf.	Latour	1987;	Brunson	1987,	2000),	or	as	a	process	of	contextualization	within	a	specific	organizational	environment	(cf.	Czarniawska	and	Joerges	1996).	However,	we	have	chosen	to	address	aspects	of	the	form	of	the	representations	of	the	future	organization	(seen	as	a	boundary	object),	with	related	consequences	for	local	interpretations.	More	specifically,	the	resemblance	of	the	use	of	the	term	"team"	in	both	representations	(BOI	and	BFA)	seems	to	contribute	to	equivocation	(and	fallacy	of	four	terms).	Further,	the	lack	of	familiarity	with	the	semantic	content	of	the	terms	used	in	the	representations,	combined	with	cognitive	logical	bias	in	the	form	of	Erasmus	syllogisms,	seems,	in	our	present	case,	to	enhance	radical	innovation	in	terms	of	alteration	of	both	form	and	meaning.			
Conclusion	Our	analysis	demonstrates	that	specific	characteristics	of	objects	(forms,	signs)	used	to	represent	ideas,	in	interplay	with	rather	hard-wired	aspects	and	constraints	in	human	cognitive	capabilities	making	certain	logical	fallacies	rather	unavoidable,	may	contribute	to	merging	of	concepts	and	rather	radical	alteration	of	objects	and	ideas.	As	a	tentative	generalization	from	this	demonstration	we	suggest	that	studies	of	diffusions	in	management	theories,	as	well	as	most	analyses	of	knowledge	sharing,	learning	and	innovation	processes	between	or	within	organizations,	may	profit	from	more	systematic	analysis	of	objects	(forms,	signs)	used	for	representing	meaning	and	involved	cognition	processes,	in	order	to	better	understand		outcomes	of	specific	translation	processes.		Performances	of	valid	logical	reasoning,	for	most	persons,	and	especially	when	logical	relations	between	structural	forms	turn	more	complex,	depend	much	on	semantic	contents	expressing	logical	relations	and	according	matching	to	activation	of	preceding	cognitive	schemas	with	some	cultural	flavor.	Syllogisms	judged	as	invalid	by	criteria	of	formal	logics,	while	not	recognized	as	invalid	by	main	actors,	may	in	some	contexts	prove	crucial,	fruitful,	and	productive	in	order	to	achieve	significant	innovations.	The	paper	has	sought	to	account	for	one	such	case,	where	the	non-logical	endorsement	of	a	certain	invalid	dead-weighted	Erasmus	syllogism	proved	to	be	constructive	in	order	to	create	and	implement	certain	adequate	and	potent	innovations.	Thus,	despite	
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logical	reasoning	being	preferable	when	other	things	are	considered	equal,	there	may	occur	interesting	exceptions	from	the	rule,	where	collective	endorsement	to	non-logical	operators	may	even	prove	necessary	for	innovation	and	implementation	of	certain	creative	actions.			
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